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Abstract
We investigate the role of firm heterogeneity in considering profitability and desirability of
mergers in the international economy. Analysis shows that higher trade costs make only cross-
border mergers profitable whereas larger firm heterogeneity is likely to increase both domestic
and cross-border mergers. Furthermore, it is shown that whether or not a merger leads to
merger waves depends on the types of firms involved in it. It is also demonstrated that larger
firm heterogeneity can reduce the discrepancy between profitability and desirability of mergers
when the trade cost is sufficiently low.
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1 Introduction
During the past two decades, we have observed the world wide proliferation of mergers and acqui-
sitions (M&As). The number of M&As worldwide in excess of one million dollar during 2000-2001
is more than twice as that during 1990-1991 (Hijzen et al [15]). This trend is common for both
domestic and cross-border M&As: from 1990-1991 to 2000-2001, the number of domestic M&As
has risen from 6,281 to 13,557 and the number of cross-border M&As has risen from 2,161 to 5,319.
It is then natural to investigate the causes and consequences of this proliferation of both types of
mergers in a unified framework.
In investigating these, we focus on firm heterogeneity, which is already shown to play key roles
in the international economy. In particular, in the face of new established facts regarding differences
in the performance of firms in the trade environment (see Bernard and Jensen [4][5], among others),
the impact of trade in the presence of heterogeneous firms has been intensively investigated by
studies such as Melitz [21], Helpman et al. [13], Melitz and Ottaviano [22] and Antras and Helpman
[1].12 These scholars developed monopolistic competition models with heterogeneous firms and
uncovered trade impacts on the industrial structure and firms, which include the fact that trade
in the presence of firm heterogeneity leads to self-selection of firms: efficient firms sell goods both
domestically and internationally whereas inefficient firms sell goods only domestically.
In this paper, we introduce firm heterogeneity into a Cournot oligopoly model with trade a
la Brander [7] and Brander and Krugman [8], and examine the profitability (i.e., causes) and
desirability (i.e., consequences) of M&As.3 This modeling strategy fits quite well to the analysis of
M&As because there is a long tradition of industrial organization literature to use Cournot models
in analyzing M&As. Salant et al [28] established the well-known ”Cournot merger paradox,” which
claims that mergers between identical firms are unprofitable unless the merged firm produces a very
high proportion of pre-merger industry output over 80% when firms engage in Cournot competition
and demand is linear. Subsequent studies showed that mergers are possible in Cournot competition
1Mannase and Turrini [20] considered a model in which the heterogeneity of firms arises from differences in the
skills of entrepreneurs and obtained results regarding industrial changes due to trade openness that were similar to
those of Melitz [21].
2For recent surveys, see Baldwin [2], Greenaway and Kneller [10], and Helpman [14].
3Of course, in the enormous trade literature, there are studies that introduce firm heterogeneity into a Cournot
model with trade. Very recent examples include Ishikawa and Komoriya [18], who examined the effects of counter-
vailing duties when subsidies provided in exporting countries cause serious injuries.
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once we introduce additional factors such as cost synergies (see Farrell and Shapiro [11]), fixed stock
of production factors (see Perry and Porter [26]), spatial competition (see Levy and Reitzes [19]),
and demand uncertainty (see Qiu and Zhou [27]).4
In the model developed in this paper, we consider two countries in each of which firms are
different in their marginal cost of production. We consider horizontal M&As and hence there is no
upstream and downstream distinction among firms. We investigate how the cost difference could
interplay with trade environments such as trade costs to determine profitability and desirability
of mergers. We first build our arguments on the simple case in which there are two firms in each
country, one of which is efficient and can produce at a lower cost and the other of which is inefficient
and produce at a higher cost. This simple setting enables us to investigate fully the profitability and
desirability of merger waves as well as a pairwise merger. Analysis shows that it is likely that larger
firm heterogeneity leads to proliferation of both domestic and cross-border mergers. Moreover,
we characterize discrepancy between profitability and desirability for each type of a merger. It is
also shown that whether or not the first pairwise merger leads to merger waves depends on the
type of firms involved in it. We next focus on the asymmetry between countries regarding firm
heterogeneity by assuming that the share of efficient firms can be different between countries. We
then confirm that larger heterogeneity would lead to more mergers. Furthermore, we show that
profitable mergers are socially undesirable (resp. desirable) when cost difference is small (resp.
large) when the trade cost is sufficiently low.
Existing studies such as Barros [3] and Neary [24] showed that mergers between firms with
different marginal costs could be profitable even under Cournot competition. However, they consider
a world without trade costs.5 In contrast, our primary focus is on the case in which trade costs play
an important role. Of course, several existing studies has already investigated the role of trade costs
in M&As and showed that in the presence of trade costs, a cross-border merger provides access to
a foreign market. This effect is called the ”tariff jumping” and leads to merger incentives, which is
empirically shown to exist by Hijzen et al [15]. Recent studies that showed this effect theoretically
include Horn and Persson [17], Fumagalli and Vasconcelos [12], and Salvo [29].6 Especially, Salvo
4For further detail on this literature, see Huck et at [16] and Chapter 16 of Pepall et al [25].
5Barros [3] considered only domestic mergers. Neary [24] considered two countries, in one of which all firms produce
at a lower costs and in the other of which all firms produce at a higher costs. Moreover, Neary [24] assumed no trade
costs.
6Note here that the effects of trade costs on merger incentives are not as simple as it may look at first sight. For
example, Bjorvatn [6] showed that economic integration may trigger cross-border M&As by reducing the business
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[29] examined profitability of mergers with both trade costs and international difference in quality
of goods, and showed that higher trade costs and larger quality difference lead to higher incentives
of mergers. His results are quite consistent with the results obtained in this paper. The important
departure of our analysis from his analysis is that we consider firm heterogeneity within each country,
which yields much richer results. Moreover, we provide welfare arguments, which are absent from
Salvo [29].
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a basic model and analyze the
trade patterns. Section 3 examines the simple pairwise mergers whereas Section 4 focuses on the
merger waves. In Section 5, we explore the role of asymmetry between countries regarding firm
heterogeneity. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Basic setup
2.1 Model
We first derive the trade patterns, and then examine the profitability and the desirability of mergers.
Consider two countries, H (home) and F (foreign), in each of which two firms (1 and 2) are playing
the Cournot competition. Within each country, firms are heterogeneous in the sense that they differ
in their marginal cost: firm 1 has lower marginal cost, which is normalized to zero, whereas the
marginal cost of firm 2 is c > 0. For the moment, we assume that two countries are symmetric and
the cost distribution is the same across two countries.7
We assume that demand for the homogeneous good Q is determined by a simple linear demand
function:
P = 1−Q, (1)
where P is the price. Assume that c < 1/2, under which both firms 1 and 2 obtain positive operating
profits in the closed economy. Firms can export goods to a foreign market incurring the trade cost
τ > 0 as well as supply goods in a domestic market with no trade cost. When τ is sufficiently high,
no firms export and the economy is in the autarky. When all firms are supplying in both countries,
stealing effect and by reducing the reservation price of the target firm. Chaudhuri and Benchekroun [9] demonstrated
that marginal and non-marginal reductions in trade costs have different effects on the social desirability of mergers.
7In the later section, we consider n firms in each country and consider the effects of asymmetric cost distribution
across countries.
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firms’ profits in country j (j = H,F ) are given as
π1j = Pjq1jj + (Pk − τ)q1jk for firm 1, (2)
π2j = (Pj − c)q2jj + (Pk − c− τ)q2jk for firm 2,
where qijj and qijk represent the supply of goods of firm i located at country j in country j (i.e.,
in a domestic market) and that in country k (k = j, k = H,F ) (i.e., in a foreign country). Here,
the total supply Q in country j is given by Qj = q1jj + q2jj + q1kj + q2kj. Each firm supplies goods
whenever the price exceeds the cost of supply:
r1jd ≡ Pj > 0⇒ q1jj > 0 and r1jx ≡ Pk − τ > 0⇒ q1jk > 0, (3)
r2jd ≡ Pj − c > 0⇒ q2jj > 0 and r2jx ≡ Pk − c− τ > 0⇒ q2jk > 0.
rijd and rijx represent the profits per unit supply from domestic sales and from export, respectively.
Exploring these conditions, we can see how trade patterns emerge according to the level of the trade
cost τ .
2.2 Trade patterns
We consider the following cases that are relevant to our analysis.8 Pattern (i): All firms supply
goods in both countries. Pattern (ii): All firms supply goods in a domestic market but only efficient
firms export. Pattern (iii): only efficient firms are active, and they supply goods in both countries.
Pattern (iv): all firms supply goods in a domestic market but no firms export (i.e., autarky). When
the cost difference between firms is small (0 < c ≤ 1/3), patterns (i), (ii), and (iv) appear for
different values of τ . When the cost difference is large (1/3 < c < 1/2), we observe patterns (ii),
(iii), and (iv).
We start from the case in which the cost difference is small by assuming that 0 < c ≤ 1/3. In
pattern (i), firms’ profits are given by (2), leading to the following supply:
q1jj =
1 + 2c + 2τ
5
and q1jk =
1 + 2c− 3τ
5
,
q2jj =
1− 3c + 2τ
5
and q2jk =
1− 3c− 3τ
5
.
From (3), we can see that for this pattern to hold true, rijd > 0 and rijx > 0 must be satisfied for
both firms. Substituting the above equations into (1), we obtain that rijd > 0 holds true for all
8Other cases are not possible in our model. See Appendix A for the full description of the arguments here.
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positive values of τ because 0 < c ≤ 1/3. Furthermore, we have
r1jx > 0⇔ τ < 1 + 2c3 and r2jx > 0⇔ τ <
1− 3c
3
. (4)
Therefore, when the trade cost τ is smaller than (1 − 3c)/3, we have pattern (i). When the trade
cost is high and τ becomes equal to (1−3c)/3, exporting is no longer profitable for inefficient firms.
And the economy turns into pattern (ii), which hold true if rijd > 0 for both firms and r1jx > 0 are
satisfied but the economy is not in pattern (i) (i.e., τ ≥ (1 − 3c)/3). Again, rijd > 0 holds true for
all positive values of τ . Furthermore, export is profitable for firm 1 as long as τ < (1+ c)/3, that is,
r1jx > 0⇔ τ < 1 + c3 , (5)
which implies that pattern (ii) emerges when (1 − 3c)/3 ≤ τ < (1 + c)/3. When τ is larger than
(1 + c)/3, no firms export and the economy is in pattern (iv) (in autarky).
Next, we consider the case in which the cost difference is large (1/3 < c < 1/2). In this case,
pattern (i) is never possible because no positive τ satisfies (4), and hence it is convenient to start
from pattern (ii). When 1/3 < c < 1/2, r1jd > 0 holds true for all positive values of τ whereas we
can see that
r2jd > 0⇔ τ > 3c− 1, (6)
r1jx > 0⇔ τ < 1 + c3 .
Hence, pattern (ii) happens when 3c− 1 < τ < (1+ c)/3. When τ is larger than (1+ c)/3, no firms
export and the economy is in pattern (iv) (in autarky). Finally, when 0 < τ ≤ 3c − 1, inefficient
firms stop producing goods and only efficient firms are active. Moreover, efficient firms supply goods
in both countries as long as τ < 1/2, which, combined with the fact that 1/3 < c < 1/2 leads to
3c− 1 < 1/2, implies that pattern (iii) holds true when 0 < τ ≤ 3c− 1.
The following proposition summarizes the above arguments.
Proposition 1 Assume that the cost difference is small (0 < c ≤ 1/3). Then, when the trade
cost τ is smaller than (1 − 3c)/3, all firms supply goods in both countries (pattern (i)). When
(1 − 3c)/3 ≤ τ < (1 + c)/3, all firms supply goods in a domestic market but only efficient firms
export (pattern (ii)). When τ > (1+ c)/3, all firms supply goods in a domestic market but no firms
export (pattern (iv)). Next assume that the cost difference is large (1/3 < c < 1/2). Then, when
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0 < τ ≤ 3c−1, only efficient firms are active, and they supply goods in both countries (pattern (iii)).
Pattern (ii) happens when 3c− 1 < τ < (1 + c)/3, and pattern (iv) holds true when τ > (1 + c)/3.
Put differently, although reductions in trade cost induce firms to engage in trade, its effects are quite
different among heterogeneous firms. It is efficient firms that are most likely to enjoy the benefits
from reductions in the trade cost. In fact, they first start exporting and for a certain range of trade
cost, only they export. When the cost difference is not large, sufficiently low trade cost enables
inefficient firms to export. However, when the cost difference is sufficiently large, low trade cost may
make inefficient firms quit production. These trade patterns are fully consistent with the results
obtained in Melitz [21] and Melitz and Ottaviano [22], which introduced firm heterogeneity into
trade models of monopolistic competition and showed that the self-selection of exporting firms are
observed according to the cost difference among firms as seen in Proposition 1. Therefore, results
here indicate that it is fairly common to have these self-selection of exporting firms in a trade model
of imperfect competition with heterogeneous firms.
3 Analysis of mergers: a pairwise merger
3.1 Types of a pairwise merger
In this section, we analyze the incentive and outcome of a pairwise merger, and in the next section,
we examine the possibility of merger waves. Before we provide the complete result of a pairwise
merger in this model, we mention four types of pairwise mergers respectively: Type (I): a cross-
border merger of efficient firms (i.e., a merger of firms 1 and 1 located at countries H and F ), Type
(II): a cross-border merger of efficient and inefficient firms (i.e., a merger of firm 1 located at country
H and firm 2 located at country F ), Type (III): a domestic merger of efficient and inefficient firms
(i.e., a merger of firms 1 and 2 located at country H), and Type (IV): a cross-border merger of
inefficient firms (i.e., a merger of firms 2 and 2 located at countries H and F ).
Here, we assume the perfect spillover of technology and once heterogeneous firms merge, the
merged firm can produce goods at a low cost. This assumption is especially relevant when we
consider cross-border mergers with trade cost. Perfect spillover implies that a cross-border merger
between efficient and inefficient firms makes it possible for a merged firm to produce goods at low
costs in both countries. Without this assumption, there is a trade off for a merged firm: it must
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choose between producing goods at low costs while it must bear transport costs to the other country
and producing goods in both countries at low costs in one country and at high costs in the other
country. In the latter case, it bears no trade cost.
In this paper, for the analytical simplicity, we assume that each merger consists of two firms and
we use simple gains from merger as a criterion of merger incentive. Therefore, when we consider a
pairwise merger, we compare the profit of a merged firm to the joint profit of firms involved in the
merger described in Section 2.2. If the former is larger than the latter, we consider that this merger
is profitable and these two firms have incentive to merge. More formally, a merger between firm i
in country j and firm h in country k is profitable if
πM − πij − πhk > 0, (7)
where πM is the profit of a merged firm, and πij and πhk represent the pre-merger profit of firm i
in country j and that of firm h in county k, respectively.
Type (I): By symmetry, we only have to consider country H. There are potentially three firms: the
merged efficient domestic firm, the inefficient domestic firm, the inefficient foreign firm. Depending
on the values of τ and c, two cases appear in the presence of a merger: (a) the merged firm and
the inefficient domestic firm supply, (b) all firms supply. In the followings, πMj and πijk represent
the profits of a merged firm from sales in country j and of firm i located in country j from sales in
country k, respectively.
Case (a) (τ ≥ (1− 2c)/3): The profits of the firms from sales in country H are:
πMH =
(1 + c)2
9
, π2HH =
(1− 2c)2
9
.
Case (b) (τ < (1− 2c)/3): The profits of the firms are:
πMH =
(1 + 2c + τ)2
16
, π2HH =
(1− 2c + τ)2
16
, π2FH =
(1− 2c− 3τ)2
16
.
Type (II): The market structure in country H is equivalent to the basic one except the absence
of the inefficient foreign firm. From Proposition 1, we have the following result.
Case (a) (τ ≥ (1 + c)/3): The profits of the firms are:
πMH =
(1 + c)2
9
, π2HH =
(1− 2c)2
9
.
Case (b) (c < 1/3 and τ < (1 + c)/3): The profits of the firms are:
πMH =
(1 + c + τ)2
16
, π2HH =
(1− 3c + τ)2
16
, π1FH =
(1 + c− 3τ)2
16
.
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Case (c) (c ≥ 1/3 and (3c− 1) ≤ τ < (1 + c)/3): The profits of the firms are:
πMH =
(1 + c + τ)2
16
, π2HH =
(1− 3c + τ)2
16
, π1FH =
(1 + c− 3τ)2
16
.
Case (d) (c ≥ 1/3 and τ < (3c − 1)): The profits of the firms are:
πMH =
(1 + τ)2
9
, π1FH =
(1− 2τ)2
9
.
In country F , the former inefficient foreign firm becomes efficient because of spillover via inte-
gration. There are potentially three firms: the merged (efficient) firm, the efficient foreign firm, and
the inefficient domestic firm. Depending on the values of τ and c, two cases appear in equilibrium:
(a’) the merged firm and the efficient foreign firm supply, (b’) all firms supply.
Case (a’) (τ ≥ (1− 3c)/3): The profits of the firms are:
πMF =
1
9
, π1FF =
1
9
.
Case (b’) (τ < (1− 3c)/3): The profits of the firms are:
πMF =
(1 + c + τ)2
16
, π1FF =
(1 + c + τ)2
16
, π2HF =
(1− 3(c + τ))2
16
.
Type (III): In this case, there are potentially three firms: the merged firm, the efficient foreign
firm, and the inefficient foreign firm. In country H, depending on the values of τ and c, two cases
appear in the presence of a merger: (a) the merged firm and the efficient foreign firm supply, (b)
all firms supply.
Case (a) ((1− 3c)/2 ≤ τ < 1/2): The profits of the firms are:
πMH =
(1 + τ)2
9
, π1FH =
(1− 2τ)2
9
.
Case (b) (τ < (1− 3c)/2 (if c ≥ 1/3, this case does not appear)): The profits of the firms are:
πMH =
(1 + c + 2τ)2
16
, π1FH =
(1 + c− 2τ)2
16
, π2FH =
(1− 3c− 2τ)2
16
.
The market structure in country F is equivalent to the basic one except the export of the
inefficient domestic firm. From Proposition 1, we have the following result.
Case (a’) (τ ≥ (1 + c)/3): The profits of the firms are:
π1FF =
(1 + c)2
9
, π2FF =
(1− 2c)2
9
.
9
Case (b’) (c < 1/3 and τ < (1 + c)/3): The profits of the firms are:
πMF =
(1 + c− 3τ)2
16
, π1FF =
(1 + c + τ)2
16
, π2FF =
(1− 3c + τ)2
16
.
Case (c’) (c ≥ 1/3 and (3c − 1) ≤ τ < (1 + c)/3): The profits of the firms are:
πMF =
(1 + c− 3τ)2
16
, π1FF =
(1 + c + τ)2
16
, π2FF =
(1− 3c + τ)2
16
.
Case (d’) (c ≥ 1/3 and τ < (3c− 1)): The profits of the firms are:
πMF =
(1− 2τ)2
9
, π1FF =
(1 + τ)2
9
.
Type (IV): By symmetry, we only have to consider country H. There are potentially three firms:
the merged inefficient domestic firm, the efficient domestic firm, the efficient foreign firm. The
market structure in country H is equivalent to the basic one except the absence of the inefficient
foreign firm. From Proposition 1, we have the following result.
Case (a) (τ ≥ (1 + c)/3): The profits of the firms are:
π1HH =
(1 + c)2
9
, πMH =
(1− 2c)2
9
.
Case (b) (c < 1/3 and τ < (1 + c)/3): The profits of the firms are:
π1HH =
(1 + c + τ)2
16
, πMH =
(1− 3c + τ)2
16
, π1FH =
(1 + c− 3τ)2
16
.
Case (c) (c ≥ 1/3 and (3c− 1) ≤ τ < (1 + c)/3): The profits of the firms are:
π1HH =
(1 + c + τ)2
16
, πMH =
(1− 3c + τ)2
16
, π1FH =
(1 + c− 3τ)2
16
.
Case (d) (c ≥ 1/3 and τ < (3c − 1)): The profits of the firms are:
π1HH =
(1 + τ)2
9
, π1FH =
(1− 2τ)2
9
.
3.2 Profitability (incentive) and desirability (welfare) of a pairwise merger
We now compare ex ante and ex post profits of the firms. From the discussions in the previous
section and the previous subsection, we can summarize the conditions of the exogenous parameters
(c and τ) in the following tables.
Type (I): a cross-border merger of efficient firms (firms 1 and 1 in countries H and F merge).
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Parameters ex ante ex post
c τ (Section 2.2) (Section 3.1)
∀c ∈ (0, 1/2) τ ≥ (1 + c)/3 (iv) (a)
c < 1/3 (1− 2c)/3 ≤ τ < (1 + c)/3 (ii) (a)
(1− 3c)/3 ≤ τ < (1− 2c)/3 (ii) (b)
τ < (1− 3c)/3 (i) (b)
1/3 ≤ c < 4/11 (1− 2c)/3 ≤ τ < (1 + c)/3 (ii) (a)
(3c − 1) ≤ τ < (1− 2c)/3 (ii) (b)
τ < (3c− 1) (iii) (b)
4/11 ≤ c < 1/2 (3c− 1) ≤ τ < (1 + c)/3 (ii) (a)
(1− 2c)/3 ≤ τ < (3c− 1) (iii) (a)
τ < (1− 2c)/3 (iii) (b)
Type (II): a cross-border merger of efficient and inefficient firms (firm 1 in country H and Firm 2
in country F merge).
Parameters ex ante ex post
c τ (Section 2.2) (Section 3.1)
(H,F )
∀c ∈ (0, 1/2) τ ≥ (1 + c)/3 (iv) (a,a’)
c < 1/3 (1− 3c)/3 ≤ τ < (1 + c)/3 (ii) (b,a’)
τ < (1− 3c)/3 (i) (b,b’)
1/3 ≤ c (3c− 1) ≤ τ < (1 + c)/3 (ii) (c,a’)
τ < (3c− 1) (iii) (d,a’)
Type (III): a domestic merger of efficient and inefficient firms (firms 1 and 2 in country H merge).
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Parameters ex ante ex post
c τ (Section 2.2) (Section 3.1)
(H,F )
c < 1/11 (1− 3c)/2 ≤ τ < 1/2 (iv) (b,a’)
(1 + c)/3 ≤ τ < (1− 3c)/2 (iv) (c,a’)
(1− 3c)/3 ≤ τ < (1 + c)/3 (ii) (c,b’)
τ < (1− 3c)/3 (i) (c,b’)
1/11 ≤ c < 1/3 (1 + c)/3 ≤ τ < 1/2 (iv) (b,a’)
(1− 3c)/2 ≤ τ < (1 + c)/3 (ii) (b,b’)
(1− 3c)/3 ≤ τ < (1− 3c)/2 (ii) (c,b’)
τ < (1− 3c)/3 (i) (c,b’)
1/3 ≤ c (1 + c)/3 ≤ τ < 1/2 (iv) (b,a’)
(3c− 1) ≤ τ < (1 + c)/3 (ii) (b,c’)
τ < (3c− 1) (iii) (b,d’)
Type (IV): a cross-border merger of inefficient firms (firms 2 and 2 in countries H and F merge).
Parameters ex ante ex post
c τ (Section 2.2) (Section 3.1)
∀c ∈ (0, 1/2) τ ≥ (1 + c)/3 (iv) (a)
c < 1/3 (1− 3c)/3 ≤ τ < (1 + c)/3 (ii) (b)
τ < (1− 3c)/3 (i) (b)
1/3 ≤ c (3c− 1) ≤ τ < (1 + c)/3 (ii) (c)
τ < (3c− 1) (iii) (d)
In each case, we have to check whether the merged firm’s profit (ex post profit) is larger than
the ex ante joint profits of firms involved in the merger. Since those calculations are simple but
highly tedious, we summarize those calculations in four figures (Figures 1-a, b, c, and d).
****************
Figures 1-a, b, c, and d here
****************
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The shaded areas of the left hand side figures represent the combinations of c and τ under which
a merger is profitable. Furthermore, the shaded areas of the right hand side figures describe the
the combinations of c and τ under which a merger is desirable from the viewpoint of social welfare.
Here, we use the social surplus W as the criterion of welfare:
W =
Q2H + Q
2
F
2
+ sum of firms’ profits. (8)
Denoting the pre-merger and post-merger surpluses as Wt and Wm, respectively, a merger is desirable
if and only if Wm −Wt > 0. Examining these figures, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2 When the trade cost is low and the cost difference is small, a merger is neither
profitable nor desirable. Increases in trade cost are likely to make a cross-border merger profitable
and desirable. Increases in the cost difference may make both cross-border and domestic mergers
profitable and desirable.
In our model, the following three factors affect merger profitability and desirability: (i) tariff
jumping, (ii) technology spillover, and (iii) degree of competition. (i) is relevant to cross-border
mergers and (ii) can make mergers between heterogeneous firms profitable and desirable. More-
over, any types of mergers changes the degree of competition, which affects the profitability and
desirability of mergers. In the followings, we explore how these three factors affect profitability and
desirability of a merger. Especially, we put emphasis on areas in which we observe discrepancies
between profitability and desirability.
Before proceeding to each type of a merger, a few comments regarding overall tendencies are in
order. First, a merger is neither profitable nor desirable at lower cost difference and lower trade cost,
which is described in the lower left area of all these figures. Since firms are nearly homogeneous
and there is little trade cost, non-profitability is explained by the well-known ”Cournot merger
paradox.” Non-desirability comes from the reductions in the consumer surplus because a merger
implies a decrease in the number of firms in the Cournot competition. Second, starting from the
lower left area, increases in the trade cost and in the cost difference make a merger profitable and
desirable, which is the results of tariff jumping and technology spillover, respectively. However,
these effects work quite differently for different types of mergers. A larger trade cost does not make
a domestic merger neither profitable nor desirable for the most part, whereas a merger is likely to
become profitable and desirable under larger heterogeneity of firms except a merger of Type (I). In
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this sense, a larger trade cost is in favor only of a cross-border merger whereas larger heterogeneity
of firms increases both domestic and cross-border mergers.
We start from Type (I), which is described in Figure 1-a. In the lower right area of this figure,
merger is profitable but undesirable. In this area, trade cost is low, and cost difference is large,
which makes inefficient firms inactive in the absence of a merger. If a cross-border merger of efficient
firms occurs, it becomes possible that inefficient firms earn positive profits and they become active.
Then, although it’s impossible for a merged firm to become a monopoly, it can still obtain a sufficient
market share for a merger to be profitable because it competes with inefficient firms. Thus, in this
area, although the tariff jumping effect is small, a cross-border merger of efficient firms reduces
competition sufficiently for it to be profitable. However, because it makes inefficient firms active,
losses in production inefficiency reduce welfare, making a cross-border merger of efficient firms
profitable but undesirable. In the higher-left area, no firms exports in the absence of a merger and
inefficient firms do not export in the presence of a merger. Hence, a merger does not alter the
market structure, and it is indifferent to firms and to the welfare.
The results for Type (II) is described in Figure 1-b. In this case, profitability and desirability
almost coincide: profitable mergers are always desirable and desirable mergers are almost profitable.
In the higher-left area, again, no firms exports in the absence of a merger and inefficient firms do
not export in the presence of a merger. Hence, a merger does not alter the market structure, and
it is indifferent to firms and to the welfare.
Figure 1-c represents the case of Type (III). In the higher left area, we observe a discrepancy
between profitability and desirability. When the cost difference is sufficiently small and firms are
quite similar, social gains from a domestic merger via technology spillover is small and merger
reduces intensity of competition, leading to the undesirability in the left area of this figure. On the
other hand, in the higher left area, the trade cost is high and a domestic market is more isolated,
yielding a higher incentive of a domestic merger. Thus, we observe discrepancy between profitability
and desirability. In the lower-right area, inefficient firms are inactive both in the presence and in
the absence of a domestic merger. Then, a domestic merger does not alter the market structure
and hence it is neither profitable nor desirable.
Finally, Figure 1-d deals with Type (IV). In the lower-right area, a cross-border merger of
inefficient firms is neither profitable nor desirable because of the small tariff jumping effect. In
contrast, we can observe that it is not profitable but desirable in the lower-center area. In this area,
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the market shares of inefficient firms shrink with a cross-border merger of inefficient firms, leading
to the unprofitability. However, a merger of inefficient firms enables efficient firms to obtain larger
shares, which lowers the price of manufactured goods in both domestic and foreign markets and
raises the consumer surplus. Therefore, it is socially desirable. In the higher-left area, inefficient
firms do not export their product in the absence of merger. In the right area, inefficient firms are
inactive regardless of merger. Thus, in these areas, merger does not change the market structure
and hence it is neither profitable nor desirable.
4 Analysis of mergers: merger waves
In this section, we explore the conditions under which we observe merger waves, that is, the condi-
tions under which a pairwise merger is followed by another merger.
4.1 Profitability (incentive) and desirability (welfare) of the second pairwise
merger
Before moving to the full analysis of merger waves, we need to examine whether there is incentive
to merge for the remaining two firms given the pairwise merger described in the previous section.
In doing so, we ignore the possibility of a merger of one firm and an already merged firm. We now
mention four types of second pairwise mergers respectively: (I-2) firms 2 and 2 in countries H and
F merge given that firms 1 and 1 in countries H and F merge, (II-2) firm 2 in country H and firm
1 in country F merge given that firm 1 in country H and firm 2 in country F merge, (III-2) firms
1 and 2 in country F merge given that firms 1 and 2 in country H merge, (IV-2) firms 1 and 1 in
countries H and F merge given that firms 2 and 2 in countries H and F merge. In considering the
incentive to merge, we again use the same criterion as that used in the previous section: gains from
merger.
Type (I-2): By symmetry, we only have to consider country H. There are potentially two firms:
the merged efficient domestic firm M1 and the merged inefficient domestic firm M2. There is only
one case: both firms supply.
The profits of the firms are:
πM1H =
(1 + c)2
9
, πM2H =
(1− 2c)2
9
.
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Type (II-2): By symmetry, we only have to consider country H. There are potentially two firms:
the merged efficient domestic firms MH1 and MH2 (one of the firms becomes efficient because of
spillover effects caused by the merger). There is only one case: both firms supply.
The profits of the firms are:
πMH1H =
1
9
, πMH2H =
1
9
.
Type (III-2): In each country, there are potentially two firms: the merged efficient domestic firms
MH and the merged efficient foreign firm MF . There is only one case: both firms supply.
In country H, the profits of the firms are:
πMHH =
(1 + τ)2
9
, πMFH =
(1− 2τ)2
9
.
In country F , the profits of the firms are:
πMHH =
(1− 2τ)2
9
, πMFH =
(1 + τ)2
9
.
Type (IV-2): By symmetry, we only have to consider country H. There are potentially two firms:
the merged efficient domestic firm M1 and the merged inefficient domestic firm MH2. There is
only one case: both firms supply.
The profits of the firms are:
πM1H =
(1 + c)2
9
, πM2H =
(1− 2c)2
9
.
We now compare ex ante and ex post profits of the merged firms. We can use the conditions
of the exogenous parameters (c and τ) in Section 3.2. In each case, we have to check whether the
merged firm’s profit (ex post profit) is larger than the ex ante joint profits of the merged firms. Since
those calculations are simple but highly tedious, we summarize those calculations in four figures
(Figures 2-a, b, c, and d).
****************
Figures 2-a, b, c, and d here
****************
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4.2 Possibility of merger waves
Combining the results obtained thus far, we can explore the possibility of merger waves by analyzing
a sequential merger game a la Nilssen and Sørgard [23]. More concretely, we provide a discussion
of merger decisions made in sequence by disjoint groups of firms. In our model, there are two
possible pairwise mergers that can take place in this industry.9 We denote the two mergers that
can potentially take place as M1 and M2, respectively. As discussed earlier, there are four types of
sequential merger:
Type (I→I-2): M1: Firms 1 and 1 in countries H and F , M2: Firms 2 and 2 in countries H and
F .
Type (II→II-2): M1: Firm 1 in country H and firm 2 in country F , M2: Firm 1 in country F
and firm 2 in country H.
Type (III→III-2): M1: Firms 1 and 2 in country H, M2: Firms 1 and 2 in country F .
Type (IV→IV-2): M1: Firms 2 and 2 in countries H and F , M2: Firms 1 and 1 in countries H
and F .
We now consider the following three-stage game. In this model, the industry is initially in the
no-merger situation. There is an opportunity for the firms in M1 to merge at stage one, and for
the firms in M2 to merge at stage two. Hence, M1 is the first mover. The firms in M2 observe
whether or not M1 has merged before they make their own merger decision. After merger decisions
are made, the firms compete in the market.
In each type of merger, there are four situations that may occur S ≡ {s0, s1, s2, s3}.
Situation s0: no merger takes place.
Situation s1: the firms in M1 merge while the firms in M2 do not merge.
Situation s2: the firms in M2 merge while the firms in M1 do not merge.
Situation s3: both the firms in M1 and the firms in M2 merge.
Situation s3 describes the merger waves.
The profit of entity τ in situation s is πτ (s) and social surplus in situation s is W (s), where
9Remind that we assumed that each merger consits of two firms and that we ignore a merger of one firm and an
already merged firm.
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s ∈ S and τ ∈ {1H, 2H, 1F, 2F,M1 ,M2}. We now define four labels Δ1i , Δ2i , Δ3i , and Δ4i as follows:
Δ1i ≡ πMi(si)−
∑
j∈Mi
πj(s0), i ∈ {1, 2},
Δ2i ≡ πMi(s3)−
∑
j∈Mi
πj(sk), i, k ∈ {1, 2}, i = k,
Δ3i ≡ πMi(s3)−
∑
j∈Mi
πj(s0), i ∈ {1, 2},
Δ4i ≡ πMi(si)−
∑
j∈Mi
πj(sk), i ∈ {1, 2}, i = k.
If Δ1i is positive, the merger of the firms in Mi increases their profits given that Mj does not merge.
If Δ2i is positive, the merger of the firms in Mi increases their profits given that Mj merges. If Δ
3
i
is positive, the sequential mergers increase the profits of the firms in Mi. If Δ4i is positive, the firms
in Mi prefers their own merger to the rival’s merger.
We now denote four regimes, according to the signs of M2’s gains from merging, either alone
(Δ12) or after M1 has merged (Δ
2
2):
Regime 1 (Δ12 ≤ 0, Δ22 ≤ 0):
⎧⎨
⎩
Δ11 > 0 s1 appears,
Δ11 ≤ 0 s0 appears.
Regime 2 (Δ12 > 0, Δ
2
2 > 0):
⎧⎨
⎩
Δ21 > 0 s3 appears,
Δ21 ≤ 0 s2 appears.
Regime 3 (Δ12 ≤ 0, Δ22 > 0):
⎧⎨
⎩
Δ31 > 0 s3 appears,
Δ31 ≤ 0 s0 appears
Regime 4 (Δ12 > 0, Δ
2
2 ≤ 0):
⎧⎨
⎩
Δ41 > 0 s1 appears,
Δ41 ≤ 0 s2 appears.
As mentioned in Nilssen and Sørgard [23](p.1689, Proposition 1), in regime r, M1 should merge
if and only if Δr1 > 0, r ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. In each regime, we check the sign of Δr1 and what situations
appear under the exogenous parameters. Since those calculations are simple but highly tedious, we
summarize those calculations in four figures (Figures 3-a, b, c, and d).
****************
Figures 3-a, b, c, and d here
****************
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From these figures, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The large cost difference induces both domestic and cross-border merger waves that
consist of mergers between heterogeneous firms. Cross-border merger waves that consist of mergers
between firms of the same type are possible only when both the cost difference and trade cost are
moderate.
From Figure 3-b and Figure 3-c, it is noteworthy that a merger between heterogeneous firms
always leads to merger waves. This result is very similar to that obtained in Salvo [29] (Proposition
1). However, quite different pictures emerge when we focus on mergers between firms of the same
type. The first pairwise merger is unlikely to be followed by another merger when both the trade
cost and cost difference are sufficiently large (See Figure 3-a, and Figure 3-d). This indicates that
the possibility of merger waves depends on the type of firms involved in the lead-off merger.
5 Asymmetric countries
In this section, we examine the effects of asymmetry between countries on the profitability and
desirability of mergers. Here, we restrict our attention only on a pairwise merger between two firms
as in the case of myopic merger incentives described in Neary [24]. Consider n firms (n > 2) in
each country. Among n firms, λjn firms are efficient firms (type 1 firms) and (1 − λj)n firms are
inefficient firms (type 2 firms), where 0 ≤ λj ≤ 1. Note here that λj may differ between countries.
Prices in a Cournot equilibrium when all firms engage in trade are given by
Pj = 1−Qj
= 1− [λjnq1jj + (1− λj)nq2jj + λknq1kj + (1− λk)nq2kj],
and equilibrium outputs are determined by
q1jj = Pj and q1jk = Pk − τ, (9)
q2jj = Pj − c and q2jk = Pk − c− τ.
19
5.1 No trade cost case
As a benchmark analysis, we start with a case with no trade cost (τ = 0), which enables us to
abstract from examining trade patterns before/after mergers. In this case, it is indifferent for firms
to sell their produced goods in both countries, and the conditions under which inefficient firms
produce are given by
λH + λF < Γ ≡ 1− c
cn
.
Note here that it can be readily confirmed that the efficient firms always produce. Therefore, both
types of firms produce if λH + λF < Γ. We assume this inequality to hold true throughout this
subsection. As in Section 3, the merger incentive is examined by the profitability (7) of a merger
that is defined as the difference between the profit of a firm after merger and the total profits of
two firms before merger. The following proposition summarizes the merger in this case:10
Proposition 4 There is no incentive of merger for two efficient firms, or for two inefficient firms.
An efficient firm and an inefficient firm have incentive to merge if and only if λH + λF > Ω.
Here, Ω is defined as
Ω ≡ 4n (n− 1)− 1− c
(
12n2 − 1)
cn [4n (n− 1)− 1] .
Figure 4 describes the region in which a merger between heterogeneous firms is profitable. In the
figure, the horizontal and vertical axes represent λH and λF , respectively.
****************
Figure 4 here
****************
First note that a merger between heterogeneous firms is profitable if there are a sufficiently large
number of efficient firms in the economy as a whole. In this case, a merger implies a reduction in the
number of inefficient firms, leading to a trade-off between increases in the price and reductions in the
joint output of two merging firms compared to the pre-merger environment. When a lot of efficient
firms are in the economy, the second effect becomes ignorable because the output of an inefficient
firm in the pre-merger environment is sufficiently small. Second note that in the absence of trade
10See Appendix B for the proof of this proposition.
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cost, a domestic merger has exactly the same impacts on the economy as a cross-border merger.
Therefore, this case is very similar to that analyzed in Neary [24], in which all firms in one country
have low costs and all firms in the other country have high costs. The focus of Neary [24] is on
the merger impacts on the relationship between the degree of cost heterogeneity between countries
and the specialization pattern of countries. In contrast, our focus here is on the relationship among
merger, firm heterogeneity and the degree of asymmetry between countries. Finally, as the cost
difference c becomes larger, Ω as well as Γ decrease. Therefore, if λH + λF is sufficiently low and a
merger between heterogeneous firms is unprofitable, successive increases in c will make the merger
profitable. In this sense, larger heterogeneity leads to more mergers.
The assumption of no trade cost enables us to go one step further and we can examine when
mergers described above is desirable from the welfare viewpoint even with asymmetric countries.
Again, the criterion of welfare is the social surplus W that is given by (8). Denoting the pre-merger
and post-merger surpluses as Wt and Wm, respectively, it is readily confirmed that
Wm −Wt = c
2 [3 + 8n (1 + n)]
4 (1 + 2n)2
(λH + λF − Γ) (λH + λF − Φ) ,
where Φ is defined as
Φ ≡ c
[
4n
(
8n2 + 4n − 1)− 3]− 16n3 + 8n + 3
cn [8n (1 + n) + 3]
.
From this, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 5 A merger between an efficient firm and an inefficient firm is desirable if and only
if λH + λF < Φ.
Once we compare Φ with Γ and with Ω, we observe three possible cases, which are described in
Figures 5-a, b, and c.11
****************
Figures 5-a, b, and c here
****************
11See Appendix C for details.
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Figure 5-a represents the case of small cost difference c. In this case, Φ is small and the desirability
of a merger requires that there are only few efficient firms in the economy. This is because small
cost difference implies small gains from improving efficiency by a merger, which dominates the loss
from decreasing number of firms only when efficient firms are scarce. As a result, profitable mergers
are not desirable whereas desirable mergers are not profitable. As the cost difference gets larger,
the effect of improving efficiency becomes larger and the region in which a merger is desirable also
becomes larger, leading to Figure 5-b. Now a part of profitable mergers are desirable. When the
cost difference is sufficiently large, as seen in Figure 5-c, all profitable mergers become desirable.
5.2 Positive trade cost case
We introduce the trade cost into the economy described in the previous section. In this section, we
use a numerical example in examining how firm heterogeneity and trade costs affect the incentive of
merger. We specify n as 5. Moreover, we focus on the case in which all firms engage in trade before
and after mergers, which hold true if c ≤ 2/25 and τ ≤ 1/50. Here, we present the case of small
(c = 1/25), moderate (c = 3/50), and large (c = 2/25) cost difference. In each case, we consider a
low (τ = 1/100), moderate (τ = 3/200), and high (τ = 1/50) trade cost. Figures 6-a, b, and c show
the incentive of a pairwise merger.
****************
Figures 6-a, b, and c here
****************
In the figures, again, the horizontal and vertical axes represent λH and λF , respectively. A
pairwise merger is profitable for (λH , λF ) in the shaded regions. Because a domestic merger between
firms of the same type is never profitable, we examine Type (i): a cross-border merger between
efficient firms (1 and 1), Type (II): that between low and inefficient firms (1 and 2), Type (III): a
domestic merger between low and inefficient firms (1 and 2), and Type (IV): a cross-border merger
between inefficient firms (2 and 2).
When the cost difference is small, any types of merger is not profitable (Figure 6-a). As the cost
difference gets larger, some types of merger become profitable (Figures 6-b and c). In this sense,
larger heterogeneity leads to higher incentives of mergers. Moreover, Figures 6-b and c show that a
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high trade cost leads to higher incentive of cross-border mergers whereas it may lower incentives of
domestic mergers. Among cross-border mergers, it is most likely that the one between heterogeneous
firms is profitable. A merger between inefficient firms is less likely to be profitable but may be still
profitable for a sufficiently high trade cost. A merger between efficient firms is the least profitable.
6 Concluding remarks
We investigated the role of firm heterogeneity in considering M&As in the international economy.
We showed that larger firm heterogeneity leads to proliferation of both domestic and cross-border
mergers and that whether or not the first pairwise merger leads to merger waves depends on the
types of firms involved in it. Furthermore, we uncovered the conditions under which one can
find discrepancy between profitability and desirability for a merger. Although we don’t intend to
claim that our arguments took all things regarding M&As into consideration, it would be safe to
say that our analysis shed some light on the important features of M&As. Especially, given the
important literature on firm heterogeneity in the field of international trade, our results would play
an important role of working as a bridge between this trade literature and M&A literature.
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Appendix A. Derivations of trade patterns
This appendix describes the formal derivations of trade patterns. Note first that any firm
obtains positive profit from domestic sales whenever profit from export is positive. Note further
that efficient firms obtains positive profit from domestic sales (from export) whenever inefficient
firms obtain positive profit from domestic sales (from export). Note finally that the assumption
c < 1/2 ensures that all firms earn positive profit under autarky. Then, possible cases are the
followings: pattern (i): All firms supply goods in both countries. Pattern (ii): All firms supply
goods in a domestic market but only efficient firms export. Pattern (iii): only efficient firms are
active, and they supply goods in both countries. Pattern (iv): all firms supply goods in a domestic
market but no firms export (autarky).
Pattern (i) is fully described in the main text and we obtain
r1jd > 0,∀τ > 0 and r1jx > 0⇔ τ < 1 + 2c3 (A1)
r2jd > 0⇔ τ > 3c− 12 and r2jx > 0⇔ τ <
1− 3c
3
.
In pattern (ii), firms’ profits in country j are given as
π1j = Pjq1jj + (Pk − τ)q1jk,
π2j = (Pj − c)q2jj,
and the total supply Q in country j is given by Qj = q1jj + q2jj + q1kj. Hence, the supply functions
become
q1jj =
1 + c + τ
4
and q1jk =
1 + c− 3τ
4
,
q2jj =
1 + c + τ
4
.
Substituting the above equations into (1), we obtain
r1jd > 0,∀τ > 0 and r1jx > 0⇔ τ < 1 + c3 , (A2)
r2jd > 0⇔ τ > 3c− 1.
Similarly. pattern (iii) yields
π1j = Pjq1jj + (Pk − τ)q1jk, (A3)
q1jj =
1 + τ
3
and q1jk =
1− 2τ
3
,
r1jd > 0,∀τ > 0 and r1jx > 0⇔ τ < 12 .
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Finally, in pattern (iv), we have
π1j = Pjq1jj, (A4)
π2j = (Pj − c)q2jj ,
r1jd > 0,∀τ > 0,
r2jd > 0,∀τ > 0.
From (A1), we know that pattern (i) is possible for some positive trade cost τ only when
0 < c ≤ 1/3. Hence, we consider the case of 0 < c ≤ 1/3 and that of 1/3 < c < 1/2 separately. We
start from the case of 0 < c ≤ 1/3. In this case, both firms earn positive profit from export as well
as domestic sales for τ smaller than (1−3c)/3, and thus pattern (i) appears. Note further that only
pattern (i) happens when 0 < τ < (1 − 3c)/3 because each firm supplies goods whenever the price
exceeds the cost of supply (See (3)). Put differently, when 0 < τ < (1− 3c)/3, even inefficient firms
can earn from export and other patterns (say, pattern (ii)) cannot be equilibrium. If τ becomes
larger than (1−3c)/3, (A1) implies that inefficient firms cannot earn from export, and the economy
is now in pattern (ii). Pattern (ii) holds true as long as (1− 3c)/3 ≤ τ < (1 + c)/3 (see (A2)). For
τ = (1 + c)/3, export is not profitable even for efficient firms, and the economy is in the autarky
(pattern (iv)) when τ > (1 + c)/3.
In the case large cost difference (1/3 < c < 1/2), it is convenient to start from pattern (ii), which
is, from (A2), now possible when 0 < 3c − 1 < τ < (1 + c)/3. For τ = 3c − 1, even domestic sales
are not profitable for inefficient firms and they stop producing goods, and pattern (iii) emerges.
Because 3c− 1 < 1/2, (A3) implies that pattern (iii) holds true when 0 < τ ≤ 3c − 1. Meanwhile,
when τ = (1 + c)/3, export is not profitable even for efficient firms, and the economy is in the
autarky (pattern (iv)) when τ > (1 + c)/3.
Appendix B. Pairwise mergers under asymmetric countries with no
trade cost
In this case, it is sufficient to consider the following three cases because we need not to distinguish
between the domestic merger from a cross-border merger: (i) efficient firms merge, (ii) efficient and
inefficient firms merge, and (iii) inefficient firms merge. Moreover, it is obvious that a merger
between firms of the same type is not profitable, i.e., (i) and (iii) are not profitable for ∀λj ∈ [0, 1]
and ∀n > 2.
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Therefore, it is sufficient to consider only (ii). When an efficient firm in H and an inefficient
firm in F merge, the total outputs of H and F are given by
QH = qmH + (λHn− 1)q1HH + (1− λH)nq2HH + λFnq1FH + [(1− λF )n− 1]q2FH ,
QF = qmF + (λHn− 1)q1HF + (1− λH)nq2HF + λFnq1FF + [(1 − λF )n− 1]q2FF .
The first order conditions for profit maximization become (9) with τ = 0 and
qmj = Pj .
The merger incentive In is now described by
In = πm − π1H − π2F .
In this case, we observe that
In > 0
⇔ λH + λF < Γ and λH + λF > Ω,
where
Ω ≡ 4n (n− 1)− 1− c
(
12n2 − 1)
cn [4n (n− 1)− 1] .
Note here that
Γ− Ω = 4 + 8n
4n (n− 1)− 1 > 0.
Because we assume that λH + λF < Γ, In > 0 if and only if λH + λF > Ω.
Appendix C. Profitability and desirability of a pairwise merger
Note first that in this subsection, a merger is profitable if and only if λH + λF > Ω, and it is
desirable if and only if λH + λF < Φ because we consider only the case of λH + λF < Γ. Moreover,
we already know that Γ > Ω. Simple comparison yields
Φ > Ω ⇔ c > n[4n(n− 1)− 1]
8n3 − 2n2 + 1
and
Φ > Γ ⇔ c > 2n
1 + 4n
.
Therefore, when c ≤ n[4n(n − 1) − 1]/(8n3 − 2n2 + 1), we have Figure 5-a. And when n[4n(n −
1) − 1]/(8n3 − 2n2 + 1) < c ≤ 2n/(1 + 4n), we observe Figure 5-b. Finally, the case in which
c > 2n/(1 + 4n) leads to Figure 5-c.
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Figure 1-a: Profitability and desirability of a pairwise merger (Type (I): a
cross-border merger of efficient firms (firms 1 in H and 1 in F)).
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Figure 1-b: Profitability and desirability of a pairwise merger (Type (II): a
cross-border merger of efficient and inefficient firms (firms 1 in H and 2 in F)).
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Figure 1-c: Profitability and desirability of a pairwise merger (Type (III): a domestic
merger of efficient and inefficient firms (firms 1 and 2 in H)).
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Figure 1-d: Profitability and desirability of a pairwise merger (Type (IV): a
cross-border merger of inefficient firms (firms 2 in H and 2 in F)).
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Figure 2-a: Profitability and desirability of the second pairwise merger (Type (I-2)).
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Figure 2-b: Profitability and desirability of the second pairwise merger (Type (II-2)).
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Figure 2-c: Profitability and desirability of the second pairwise merger (Type
(III-2)).
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Figure 2-d: Profitability and desirability of the second pairwise merger (Type
(IV-2)).
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Figure 3-a: Sequential mergers (Type (I → I-2)).
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Figure 3-b: Sequential mergers (Type (II → II-2)).
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Figure 3-c: Sequential mergers (Type (III → III-2)).
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Figure 3-d: Sequential mergers (Type (IV → IV-2)).
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Figure 4: Merger incentive under country asymmetery with no trade cost.
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Figure 5-a: Profitability and desirability: The case of small cost difference
(c ≤ n[4n(n− 1)− 1]/(8n3 − 2n2 + 1)).
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Figure 5-b: Profitability and desirability: The case of moderate cost difference
(n[4n(n− 1)− 1]/(8n3 − 2n2 + 1) < c≤ 2n/(1 + 4n)).
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Figure 5-c: Profitability and desirability: The case of large cost difference
(c > 2n/(1 + 4n)).
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Figure 6-a: Merger incentive under country asymmetery with trade cost: The case of
small cost difference (c = 1/25).
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Figure 6-b: Merger incentive under country asymmetery with trade cost: The case of
moderate cost difference (c = 3/50).
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Figure 6-c: Merger incentive under country asymmetery with trade cost: The case of
large cost difference (c = 2/25).
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